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 OPINION OF THE COURT 




ROTH, Circuit Judge: 
 The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or the Board) 
petitions to enforce its July 6, 1992, order against employer New 
Associates d/b/a Hospitality Care (Hospitality Care).  The order 
requires Hospitality Care to recognize 1115 Nursing Home and 
Hospital Employees Union (the Union), a division of 1115 Joint 
  
Board, as the exclusive bargaining representative of a certain 
unit of Hospitality Care employees and to cease and desist from 
certain unfair labor practices.  Hospitality Care cross-petitions 
for review of the order.   
 The issue for our consideration is whether Hospitality 
Care was guilty of an unfair labor practice when, due to a 
pending decertification petition, it withdrew from further 
collective bargaining and it refused the Union's request for 
certain employee and financial records.  For the reasons set out 
below, we will deny the NLRB's petition for enforcement of its 
order, we will grant Hospitality Care's petition for review, and 
we will remand this case to the NLRB to permit it to determine 
whether, under the rule we adopt here, the Board chooses to 
inform Hospitality Care of the percentage of employees who signed 
the decertification petition. 
 
 I. 
 Hospitality Care operates a nursing home facility in 
Newark, New Jersey.  Through several collective bargaining 
agreements (CBAs), Hospitality Care has recognized the Union as 
the exclusive bargaining representative of a unit of Hospitality 
Care employees.  On May 1, 1990, pursuant to the terms of the 
then existing CBA, the Union sought to reopen and negotiate wages 
and other general terms and conditions of employment.  It asked 
Hospitality Care for the names, addresses, dates of hire, 
  
categories, and wage rates of all employees covered by the CBA in 
order to formulate future bargaining demands and to make the 
employees aware of their eligibility for benefits and raises.  
Apparently, there was some confusion regarding the request and 
Hospitality Care did not supply the information. 
 On June 1, 1990, the Union sent Hospitality Care a list 
of demands for a new CBA.  The list requested a wage increase for 
each year of the proposed agreement as well as other increases 
and benefits.  Thereafter, the parties conducted three 
negotiating sessions.  At each meeting, Hospitality Care rejected 
the Union's demands stating that, because it was having 
difficulty obtaining reimbursement from the state of New Jersey, 
it needed to have a total wage freeze for the first year of the 
new agreement.  While the Union agreed to wage reductions in the 
third year, it would not agree to the first year wage freeze.      
 The parties held their last meeting on August 9, 1990.  
The Union again requested the employee information it had been 
seeking since May.  Hospitality Care indicated that it was still 
in the process of compiling the information.  The meeting ended 
without an agreement and without a date for further negotiations. 
 Shortly after the August 9 meeting, the Union contacted 
Hospitality Care and requested the employee information as well 
as permission to audit Hospitality Care's financial records in 
order to verify that Hospitality Care was unable to afford a 
  
first year wage increase.  Despite the Union's repeated requests, 
Hospitality Care failed to supply any of the information. 
 On August 23, 1990, a Hospitality Care employee filed a 
decertification petition with the NLRB asserting that at least 
thirty percent of the employees no longer recognized the Union as 
their official bargaining representative.  See National Labor 
Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1)(A)(ii).  Generally, 
an employee will file such a petition with a Regional Office of 
the NLRB in order to terminate the recognized union's status as 
bargaining representative.  If the petition is supported by at 
least thirty percent of the unit employees and if the NLRB finds 
reasonable cause to believe that there is merit to the petition, 
the Regional Director will conduct a hearing.  Id. at § 
159(c)(1).  If the hearing demonstrates that there is a serious 
question of the union's representative status, the NLRB will hold 
a decertification election within the bargaining unit.  Id. 
 In this case, although the NLRB made an initial 
determination that the prescribed minimum number of employees no 
longer supported the Union, it did not release the exact 
percentage of non-supporting employees to Hospitality Care.  As a 
result, Hospitality Care did not know whether a majority of the 
employees sought decertification.  Hospitality Care withdrew from 
further collective bargaining based on its assertion that the 
filing of the petition demonstrated a substantial showing of lack 
of support for the Union. 
  
 On September 12, 1990, while the decertification 
petition was still pending, the Union filed an unfair labor 
practice charge with the NLRB.  The Union alleged that 
Hospitality Care had failed to bargain collectively in good faith 
because it refused to contribute to the Union's funds and to 
submit accurate lists of employees.  After filing the charge, the 
Union attempted to schedule another bargaining session with 
Hospitality Care and requested audited financial statements 
covering several years.  At the NLRB hearing, Hospitality Care 
indicated that it had denied the Union's requests due to the 
pending decertification petition.  Hospitality Care argued that 
it had properly withdrawn from bargaining because a substantial 
number of employees no longer recognized the Union as their 
legitimate bargaining representative. 
 On September 19, 1991, Administrative Law Judge Fish 
concluded that Hospitality Care had violated sections 8(a)(1) and 
(5) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(1),(5), by failing to meet 
and bargain with the Union.  Judge Fish found in addition that 
Hospitality Care had engaged in an unfair labor practice by 
failing to furnish information relevant to collective bargaining 
and by refusing to permit an audit of its financial records.  
Judge Fish recommended that Hospitality Care cease and desist 
from refusing to bargain collectively with the Union.  He held 
that, upon the Union's request, Hospitality Care should furnish 
the names, addresses, dates of hire, categories, and wage rates 
  
of unit employees.   Moreover, Hospitality Care should provide 
the Union with audited financial statements or permit the Union 
to audit its financial records.  Hospitality Care filed 
exceptions to Judge Fish's recommended order.  
 While the NLRB was considering Judge Fish's decision 
and Hospitality Care's exceptions to it, the parties resumed 
collective bargaining.  On January 8, 1992, they executed a new 
agreement effective through December 23, 1995.  The NLRB 
subsequently issued an order on July 6, 1992, adopting Judge 
Fish's determination.  Hospitality Care has refused to provide 
the Union with its audited financial statements or to permit the 
Union to conduct an audit of its financial records.  Hospitality 
Care maintains that such information is moot due to the new 
collective bargaining agreement.  To date, Hospitality Care has 
not fully complied with the NLRB order.1   
 The NLRB filed an application for enforcement of its 
order with this Court.  Hospitality Care filed a cross petition 
for review of the order.  The NLRB has held the decertification 
petition in abeyance pending the outcome of this case. 
 
 II. 
                     
1
.  We note that Hospitality Care has filed a motion to expand 
the record to include evidence that it partially complied with 
the order by providing the Union with, inter alia, the names, 
addresses, and dates of hire of employees in the bargaining unit.  
Because the evidence does not influence our decision, we will 
grant the motion. 
  
 The NLRB had subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 
section 10(a) of the NLRA.  29 U.S.C. § 160(a).  This Court has 
jurisdiction over both the NLRB's application for enforcement of 
its final order and Hospitality Care's cross-petition for review 
pursuant to sections 10(e) and (f) of the NLRA.  29 U.S.C.  
§§ 160(e),(f). 
 In reviewing a rule adopted by the NLRB, we will give 
deference to the Board's interpretation of the NLRA provided that 
the rule is rational and consistent with the Act.  See Fall River 
Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 482 U.S. 27, 42 (1987).  We 
will set aside the NLRB's factual findings only if they are not 
supported by substantial evidence.  Systems Management, Inc. v. 
N.L.R.B., 901 F.2d 297, 300 (3d Cir. 1990) (citing Graham 
Architectural Products Corp. v. NLRB, 697 F.2d 534, reh'g denied, 
706 F.2d 441 (3d Cir. 1983)).     
 III. 
 The NLRA is designed to foster collective bargaining 
and industrial stability by providing a procedural framework for 
employers and employees to resolve conflicts and negotiate toward 
suitable working and contractual conditions.  29 U.S.C. § 157; 
NLRB v. Pincus Bros., Inc.-Maxwell, 620 F.2d 367, 376 (3d Cir. 
1980); Brockway Motor Trucks, Div. of Mack Trucks, Inc. v. NLRB, 
582 F.2d 720, 727 (3d Cir. 1978).  It expressly confers a duty on 
employers to bargain in good faith with union representatives.  
Specifically, section 8 of the Act provides, 
  
 (a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an 
employer -- 
 
  (1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce 
employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed 
in section 157 of this title;. . .2 
 
  (5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the 
representatives of his employees. 
 
29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(1),(5).  In order to advance the bargaining 
process, an employer has an affirmative obligation to furnish the 
recognized employee representative with information relevant to 
an agreement.  NLRB v. Acme Indus. Co., 385 U.S. 432, 435-36 
(1967); NLRB v. New Jersey Bell Tel. Co., 936 F.2d 144, 150 (3d 
Cir. 1991).       
 In this case, Hospitality Care admits that it refused the 
Union's requests for employee and financial data.  It 
acknowledges that under certain circumstances such a refusal can 
constitute a failure to bargain in good faith.  See NLRB v. 
Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149, 152 (1956) (holding that when an 
employer asserts that he cannot afford to pay a wage increase, 
the Union has a right to inspect his financial records).  See 
                     
2
.  Section 7 of the Act states: 
 
   Employees shall have the right to 
self-organization, to form, join, or assist 
labor organizations, to bargain collectively 
through representatives of their own 
choosing, and to engage in other concerted 
activities for the purpose of collective 
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection. 
. . . 
 
29 U.S.C. § 157.  
  
also C-B Buick, Inc. v. NLRB, 506 F.2d 1086, 1091 (3d Cir. 1974) 
(employer failed to bargain in good faith when it claimed that it 
could not afford to meet union demands and then refused union's 
request for financial data); Facet Enters., Inc. v. NLRB, 907 
F.2d 963, 980 (10th Cir. 1990) (employer's offer of financial 
data after it claimed economic hardship was insufficient to meet 
the good faith bargaining standard because it did not provide a 
meaningful picture of the employer's financial condition).  
 Hospitality Care further admits that it withdrew from all 
negotiations with the Union.  While such actions might be 
considered violations of sections 8(a)(1) and (5) of the NLRA, 
Hospitality Care argues against enforcement of the instant order 
stating that it was no longer under a duty to bargain with the 
Union because the pending decertification petition raised a 
serious question as to the Union's representative status.3  
                     
3
.  Hospitality Care also contends that the order should not be 
enforced because the new collective bargaining agreement renders 
the requested financial information moot.  See C-B Buick, Inc. v. 
NLRB, 506 F.2d 1086 (3d Cir. 1974) (employer not required to 
comply with union's request for financial information when 
parties subsequently signed a new collective bargaining agreement 
and information was deemed irrelevant to that agreement).  We 
decline to exercise jurisdiction over this claim because 
Hospitality Care had the opportunity to raise the mootness issue 
during the administrative hearing and failed to do so.  See 29 
U.S.C. § 160(e) (providing that, absent extraordinary 
circumstances, a reviewing court shall not consider an objection 
not raised before the Board).  In declining to address this 
issue, we are in no way making any ruling on the merits of the 
argument that, under the circumstances of this case, the 
execution of the new agreement absolved Hospitality Care of any 
charge of an unfair labor practice that would be otherwise 
applicable. 
  
Hospitality Care contends that it would be a needless waste of 
time and expense to continue bargaining for an agreement that 
could be rendered void if the Union is later ousted in a 
decertification election. 
   Hospitality Care urges the court to set aside the instant 
order and apply the rationale articulated in Telautograph Corp., 
199 NLRB 892 (1972).  That case addressed factually similar 
circumstances in which an employer withdrew from bargaining based 
solely on the filing of a decertification petition.  The NLRB 
concluded that, in the absence of any evidence of employer 
misconduct, a decertification petition required the employer to 
refrain from further bargaining because the petition itself 
signified a genuine question as to the union's representative 
status.  The Board stated that the NLRA's decertification 
procedure "assures employees the right to determine that a 
currently recognized union is no longer the majority 
representative . . .."  Id. at 894. 
 In the years following Telautograph, the NLRB retreated from 
its bright line rule that an employer could suspend bargaining 
based on the filing of a decertification petition.  See RCA Del 
Caribe, Inc., 262 NLRB 963 (1982) (filing of a representation 
petition by an outside union will not permit an employer to 
withdraw from bargaining with the incumbent union).  See also 
National Cash Register Co., 201 NLRB 1034, 1035 (1973) (where it 
appears that an employer's unfair labor practice precipitated the 
  
decertification filing, employer must submit some other objective 
evidence of loss of majority support).  The NLRB eventually 
overruled Telautograph, stressing its concern with promoting 
increased stability in the bargaining relationship.  Dresser 
Indus., Inc., 264 NLRB 1088 (1982).   
 Although Dresser involved the same circumstances as 
Telautograph, the NLRB held in Dresser that an employer could not 
withdraw from bargaining while awaiting resolution of a 
decertification proceeding.  Id. at 1089.  It conceded that 
suspension of bargaining could be justified if, in addition to 
the petition, the employer submitted some objective evidence that 
the union had lost majority support.  Id. at 1089 n.7.  The 
petition itself, however, only requires the signatures of thirty 
percent of the unit employees and therefore, it "indicates 
nothing more than the disaffection of a minority of unit 
employees."  Id. at 1088.   The NLRB concluded that "[a] rule 
permitting an employer to withdraw from bargaining solely because 
a decertification petition has been filed does not give due 
weight to the incumbent union's continuing presumption of 
majority status and is not the best way to achieve employer 
neutrality in the election."  Id. at 1089. 
 Based on Dresser, the NLRB found that Hospitality Care 
committed an unfair labor practice for refusing to provide 
information to, or bargain with, the Union.  The NLRB maintains 
that Dresser is more effective than Telautograph as a means of 
  
preserving the stability and continuity of the bargaining 
relationship.    
 While several Circuits have followed Dresser, see Asseo v. 
Centro Medico del Turabo, Inc., 900 F.2d 445, 452 (1st Cir. 
1990), Briggs Plumbingware, Inc. v. NLRB, 877 F.2d 1282, 1288 
(6th Cir. 1989), St. Agnes Medical Ctr. v. NLRB, 871 F.2d 137, 
146 (D.C. Cir. 1989), Bryan Memorial Hospital v. NLRB, 814 F.2d 
1259, 1262 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 849 (1987), this 
circuit has not yet addressed the Dresser issue.  But cf. NLRB v. 
Wallkill Valley Gen. Hosp., 866 F.2d 632, 636 n.3 (3d Cir. 1989) 
(after filing of decertification petition with Board, employer 
may not avoid duty to bargain by demonstrating loss of union 
majority status resulting from employer's own unfair labor 
practice).   
 In order to better understand the impact of Dresser, it is 
helpful to review current NLRB decertification procedures.4  
According to section 9(a) of the NLRA, a union "designated or 
selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by the 
majority of the employees in a unit . . . shall be the exclusive 
representative[] of all the employees in such unit for the 
purposes of collective bargaining . . .."  29 U.S.C.  
                     
4
.  For a general discussion of the decertification process, and 
what the author considers to be the "chaotic" impact of Dresser 
on that process, see Timothy Silverman, Comment, The Effect of a 
Petition for Decertification on the Bargaining Process:  The 
Reversal of Dresser Industries, 25 San Diego L. Rev. 581 (1988).  
  
§ 159(a).  Once a union receives NLRB certification, there is an 
irrebuttable presumption that the Union is the employee 
bargaining representative.  NLRB v. Frick Co., 423 F.2d 1327, 
1330 (3d Cir. 1970); Terrell Mach. Co. v. NLRB, 427 F.2d 1088, 
1090 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 929 (1970); Celanese 
Corp. of Am., 95 NLRB 664, 672 (1951).  The employer may not 
refuse to bargain with the representative for one year following 
the date of certification.  NLRB v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., 
Inc., 406 U.S. 272, 279 n.3 (1972); NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 
395 U.S. 575, 599 n.14 (1969).  The presumption of majority 
status only becomes rebuttable at the end of the certification 
year or when the collective bargaining agreement has expired.  
NLRB v. Pennco, Inc., 684 F.2d 340 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 
U.S. 994 (1982). 
 An employer, employee, group of employees, or labor 
organization may challenge the certified union's representative 
status by filing a decertification petition with an NLRB Regional 
Office.  29 U.S.C. §§ 159(c)(1)(A) and (B).  Upon receipt of such 
a petition, the NLRB evaluates whether a "question of 
representation . . . exists."  Id.  If its investigation shows 
that a substantial number of employees support the petition, the 
Regional Director conducts a hearing.  A "substantial number" of 
the employees supporting such a petition is defined by regulation 
as "at least 30 percent."  29 CFR § 101.18(a).  At the conclusion 
of the hearing, the NLRB may direct a secret ballot election to 
  
determine the union's representative status. Id. at § 159(c)(1).   
 In reviewing the petition to determine the percentage of 
employee support, the Regional Director counts the number of 
authorization cards or employee signatures in order to determine 
whether there is a thirty percent showing of interest.  Dresser 
Indus., Inc., 264 NLRB 1088 (1982).  It is NLRB policy not to 
divulge this information to the employer.  See Wallkill Valley 
Gen. Hosp., 866 F.2d at 634 (NLRB refused employer's request for 
showing of interest information stating that such information was 
exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 
U.S.C. § 552).  Thus, while the NLRB is aware of whether or not a 
majority of employees supports a petition, the employer does not 
have the benefit of this information in assessing whether to 
continue bargaining with a union whose representative status may 
be in question. 
 The NLRB held that Hospitality Care was guilty of an unfair 
labor practice because it withdrew from bargaining on the basis 
of the decertification petition alone, without any further 
objective evidence that the Union had lost majority status.  See 
Dresser, 264 NLRB at 1089 n.7.  We conclude that such a result is 
unsound when considered in combination with the NLRB's refusal to 
disclose to the employer the percentage of employees who 
supported the decertification petition.  The NLRB possessed the 
data which would have enabled Hospitality Care to make an 
informed decision on whether the Union had lost majority support. 
  
 Dresser does not overturn the prior Board practice which 
permitted an employer to withdraw recognition of a union if the 
employer reasonably believed that a majority of the unit 
employees no longer supported the union,  See Terrell Mach. Co., 
173 NLRB 1480, 1481 (1969), enf'd 427 F.2d 1088 (4th Cir. 1970), 
cert. denied, 398 U.S. 929 (1970).  In the same light, the Board 
continues to acknowledge that, if the decertification petition, 
signed by a majority of the employees, is filed directly with the 
employer, the employer has objective grounds to believe that the 
union no longer has majority support and the employer need no 
longer recognize the union as the bargaining representative.  See 
National Medical Hosp. of Orange d/b/a Los Alamitos Medical Ctr., 
287 NLRB 415 (1987).  We conclude that it follows logically that 
notification to the Board by a majority of unit employees should 
also constitute objective evidence of a lack of union majority 
support to the employer in the event that the employer learns of 
the percentage of support for the petition.  With knowledge of 
majority support for the petition, the employer is justified in 
ceasing to bargain with the union. 
 We conclude that such an outcome is consistent with the aim 
of the NLRA to promote the resolution of conflict in the labor 
arena.  If the employer knows of the filing of the petition but 
is not aware of the percentage of support, the employer faces the 
dilemma of either continuing to bargain with the union, which may 
lose its representational status, or of refusing to bargain and 
  
exposing itself to an unfair labor practice charge.  On the other 
hand, if the union learns of the filing of a decertification 
petition, the union can delay having to face an election by 
seeking to bargain, having the employer deny that request, and 
then filing an unfair labor charge against the employer.  The 
NLRB as a general practice will not schedule an election during 
the pendency of an unfair labor practice charge.  See 
Telautograph, 199 NLRB at 893 n.4, (citing Columbia Pictures 
Corp., 81 NLRB 1313, 1314 (1949)).  With the filing of such a 
"blocking charge," a majority of employees who have filed a 
petition will not receive prompt resolution of the question of 
representation -- a result which has occurred in this case if in 
fact a majority of unit employees did sign the petition. 
 The NLRB contends, however, that the "showing of interest," 
e.g., the determination by the Board of the percentage of 
employees supporting the petition, is intended only to enable the 
Board to determine for itself whether further proceedings are 
warranted.  See In re O.D. Jennings & Co., 68 NLRB 516, 518 
(1946) (showing of interest requirement is "to enable the Board 
to determine for itself whether or not further proceedings are 
warranted, and to avoid needless dissipation of the government's 
time, effort and funds").  The NLRB maintains that, if it did 
supply the employer with the percentage of employees supporting 
the petition, a strictly administrative requirement could result 
in the immediate termination of a union and compromise the right 
  
of employees to test the union's support through a 
decertification election.  
 We find that this contention lacks merit because the 
disclosure to an employer of majority support for 
decertification, if such should be the situation, meets the long 
recognized Board position that the loss of such majority support 
warrants the employer's withdrawal of recognition of the union as 
the bargaining representative and justifies the scheduling of an 
election.  On the other hand, if a majority of the employees have 
not joined in the petition, bargaining will continue. 
 Moreover, absent any existent charge that the employer's 
unfair labor practices have caused the decertification petition 
to be filed in the first place, we are not persuaded that such 
disclosure places an undue burden on the NLRB.  Because the 
Regional Director must determine whether the petition is 
supported by thirty percent of the employees in order to proceed 
with a hearing and election, it appears that, without any 
additional administrative costs, he could also calculate whether 
over fifty percent of the employees advocate decertification. 
 
 
  IV. 
 Based on the foregoing analysis, we will grant Hospitality 
Care's petition for review of the NLRB order.  We find that the 
Dresser holding is a rational interpretation of the governing 
statute, but only in those situations where the employer has 
  
requested from the NLRB information on the percentage of 
employees who support the decertification petition and the NLRB 
has informed the employer that the percentage is less than a 
majority.   
 We acknowledge, however, that the NLRB may choose to 
continue its policy of refusing to disclose the percentage of 
employees supporting a decertification petition.  If this should 
b 
